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of-use#OAPREFLECTIONS ON UNENUMERATED  RIGHTS
Laurence H.  Tribe
The Papers in this Symposium serve up a savory blend of inquiries
into  the epistemology, the politics, and what might be called the "ge-
nealogy"  of  "unenumerated  rights"  discourse  in  constitutional
thought  and  history.  Its  stimulating  offerings  present  an  enticing
smorgasbord,  prepared  with  impressive  skill.  Only a boorish  guest
would  quibble  over this chef's choice  of recipe  or that chef's choice
of presentation.  Of greater interest to me than the particulars of the
cuisine  on display are the seemingly shared premises  and broad con-
clusions  of its creators.  They  seem, by and  large, to agree  that they
are engaged  in a quest for substances  as  elusive as  manna, and they
appear, on  the  whole,  to  have  decided  that the  objects  of their  as-
signed  search  have  an  awkward  attribute  in  common:  they  don't
really exist.
Speaking  as  a student  of the  United  States  Constitution,  I  must
confess  to  a  certain  discomfort  with  any  academic  meal  the  first
course of which begins with either (1)  the disarming proposition that
all rights,  if one reads with  sufficient care,  are somewhere  "enumer-
ated;" or  (2)  the equally unsettling proposition that no "rights," if one
is  analytically rigorous  about what to  count as a right, can be  "read"
from any fixed enumeration.
We  can,  of course,  think ourselves  into  either  of these  opposing
corners,  but  talking  in  a  language  whose  constitutive  rules  promi-
nently include the directive  that  "[t]he enumeration  in the  Constitu-
tion,  of certain  rights,  shall  not be  construed  to  deny  or  disparage
others retained  by the  people," 1  precludes  treating either category as
empty or  illusory.  The boundary  between  enumerated  and unenu-
merated rights  may be  artificial or wobbly, and  I have  no doubt that
much  may be learned  by exploring  the topic  along  that dimension,
but for purposes  of this  Comment  I'm content  to put those  consid-
erations to one side.
Returning  to  the  culinary  image  with  which  I  began,  I'm  re-
minded  of Ren6  Descartes'  imaginary  reply to  the waiter who  asked
Carl  M.  Loeb  University  Professor,  Harvard  University,  and  Professor  of Constitutional
Law,  Harvard  Law School.  For  their  able  assistance  with  this  Essay,  I  am grateful  to Warren
Postman, JD  2007, and  to  Michael  Fawcett, JD  2008,  both of whom  are currently  students  at
Harvard Law School.
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him whether he wished to have another bowl of soup.  The last words
the  great  philosopher  ever  spoke,  the  apocryphal  story  has it, were
barely audible  as he slumped face  down into his vichyssoise:  "I think
not."
In that spirit, I  set aside for the  time being a question over which
I've  puzzled  for  some  time:  whether  G6del's Theorem  demonstrat-
ing  the  inevitable  existence  of  true  but  unprovable  mathematical
propositions might somehow translate  into a parallel theorem about
the  necessary  existence  of "unenumerated"  rights-or whether  the
irreducibly  normative  character  of "rights talk"  condemns  any such
2 translation to category error.
Because the existence of unenumerated  rights is expressly posited
by our Constitution's text, I  reserve  for another  time a discussion  of
whether  their existence  is necessary or contingent.  So too, of the ob-
servation in a number of the symposium  papers that, in our constitu-
tional  culture,  calling a right "unenumerated"  typically  represents  a
way of disparaging that right: for present purposes, that observation  is
little more than a reminder that the Constitution's  commands are at
times honored  in the  breach,  given  that  the Ninth Amendment  not
only precludes inferring non-existence but also bars disparagement.
Bracketing  as  outside  our frame  inquiries  into  the  possible  non-
existence  of unenumerated  rights  or, conversely,  into  their possible
ubiquity-as  well as  investigations  of the  reasons for routinely treat-
ing non-enumeration  as  a constitutional  liability  and the  patterns  of
that supposed liability's  attribution  over the  range  of potentially  eli-
gible  candidates  across  time-what's  left to say  about these perplex-
ing entities?
My submission is that it will prove illuminating to lay bare the way
in which  unenumerated  rights  appear  to  be constructed  (or decon-
structed)  from  the  available  federal  constitutional  materials;  to  dis-
sect  the several  distinct architectures of rights  that appear  to emerge
from these  processes;  and to  identify how relationships  between  the
former and  the  latter  might suggest  which asserted  federal  constitu-
tional  rights  are  most  comfortably  described  as  "unenumerated"
when  that tag serves  not to put down  their constitutional  legitimacy
(or  even  to  challenge  their judicial  enforceability)  but simply to ex-
plore their anatomy and its morphology.
I speak here of "asserted federal constitutional rights" for two rea-
sons:  first, to exclude  as uninteresting for present purposes "constitu-
tional"  rights that do not even purport  to have  supreme status under
2 David Hume might argue that such  a translation would necessarily  ignore  the "is/ought"
distinction.  But seeJANNA  LEVIN,  A MADMAN  DREAMS  OF TURING  MACHINES  (Alfred A. Knopf,
New York  2006)  (exploring  the  moral  and  spiritual  significance  of G6del's  incompleteness
theorems).
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Article VI of the Constitution as originating in federal rather than state
law;  and  second, to distinguish  arguments  to the  effect that "r" is not
included  within  the undisputed right "R" from arguments  to  the  ef-
fect that an ostensible right "R" is not truly a "right" at all but rather a
mere imposter.
As to the former exclusion, my intention is to reject out of hand as
implausibly trivial any reading of the Ninth Amendment that treats its
reference  to  "others retained  by the people 3 as a mere  reminder of
what the Tenth Amendment standing alone would in any event have
made plain-namely, that nothing in our Constitution's enumeration
of certain federal rights may be taken to negate the reserved power  of
"the States  respectively,  or [of]  the people
4  to create, recognize,  and
protect  rights under state law that are supreme  vis-a-vis  the ordinary
lawmaking  processes of the respective states.
As to  the latter exclusion,  my purpose  is to set aside as an uninter-
esting distraction the recognition that disputes over the precise reach
and coverage  of an "enumerated" right such as the right to "freedom
of speech"-witness, for instance,  the Supreme  Court's close division
over  the  constitutionality of flag desecration  statutes5  or over  the  in-
clusion of "obscenity," variously defined, as "protected speech"6-may
be every bit as persistent and troubling as disputes over the inclusion
of an entire category of claims, such as claims to reproductive  or bod-
ily autonomy,7  in the  catalogue  of federally protected  "rights."  Both
sorts  of disputes  may indeed  be  sources  of unending  difficulty,  but
maintaining  a  distinction  between  rights  that are  enumerated  and
those that are  not entails  treating the first sort of difficulty as  differ-
ent  in  kind  from  the  difficulty  posed  by  controversies  over  which
3  U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
4  Id. amend. X.
5  See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312  (1990)  (holding in a 5-4 decision that
the Flag Protection  Act of 1989 was unconstitutional  as applied to the appellees);  Texas v. John-
son,  491  U.S.  397,  420  (1989)  (holding  in  a  5-4  decision that the  Texas  statute  banning  flag
desecration  was unconstitutional as applied to Johnson's expressive act of flag burning).
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech  Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256  (2002)  (striking down provisions
of the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 because of overbreadth  in restricting access to
protected expression);  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25  (1973)  (establishing First Amend-
ment standards for state laws proscribing the distribution of obscene materials).
7  See, e.g., Lawrence  v. Texas, 539 US 558, 567 (2003)  ("The liberty protected by the Consti-
tution allows  homosexual  persons the  right to make  this  choice  [to enter into  physically inti-
mate personal relationships].");  Cruzan v. Dir.,  Mo. Dep't of Health,  497 U.S. 261,  281  (1990)
("It  cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest  in life as well  as an in-
terest in  refusing life-sustaining  medical  treatment."); Roe  v. Wade,  410  U.S.  113,  153  (1973)
("[The]  right  to privacy,  [whether  founded in  the  Ninth Amendment or  the  Fourteenth],  is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.");
Griswold  v. Connecticut,  381  U.S.  479,  484-85  (1965)  (holding that a Connecticut  law forbid-
ding the distribution of contraception  to married couples infringed  upon the marital  relation-
ship protected  by the zone of privacy guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
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claims  of right, albeit not  grounded in  any constitutional  enumera-
tion, are legitimate and which are bogus.
To  make headway within the  domain that remains once  those  ex-
clusions are noted, I propose to describe four principal  ways in which
rights may be extracted  from, or defined with  reference  to,  the  con-
ventional  materials  of constitutional  text, structure  and  history, and
the  surrounding,  arguably  subordinate,  interpretive  sources  repre-
sented by moral, political, social, and cultural philosophy and theory.
I  call  the four geometric, geodesic, geological, and  monster-barring  or  slip-
peiy-slope avoiding.
GEOMETRIC. To envision  the first model of rights-derivation,  imag-
ine a process  of arranging  in sensible  patterns the  seemingly distinct
dots or points that represent the  loci of "enumerated" rights  and of
the spheres  of decision  and choice  that  the  exercise  of those  rights
involves;  of forming lines  and planes  that describe  the  relationships
among, and the connections  between,  those  individual points;  of fo-
cusing on the interconnecting  vectors thus formed, with attention to
the directions  and orientations of the  resulting  shapes;  and then of
articulating  the normative  significance  of the  edges and faces of the
geometric forms that constitute the emergent array.
The  famous  "rational  continuum"  described  in  the  first Justice
Harlan's  Poe v.  Ullman dissent should come  to mind," as  should  the
inductive  inference  from  lists  of validated  and  invalidated  govern-
ment  measures,  or  the  deductive  extraction  from  theories  of  the
meaning of particular enumerated  rights, of directions along which,
inputs  on the  basis  of which,  or ends  toward  which,  government  is
presumptively forbidden  to move.  Among the  consequences  of this
thought  experiment's  attention  to  forbidden  directions  of  govern-
ment movement may be a subtle shift from the practice of identifying
rights principally as  types of protected private acts to the practice of visu-
alizing rights as the mirror  images of particular  kinds of action  forbidden to
the states or to the federal government. Especially instructive  in this regard
are decisions  like  R.A. V  v.  City of St. Paul," the  case  in which Justice
Scalia insisted for a Court majority that, in identifying various catego-
ries of speech  or conduct  (e.g.,  "fighting words" or "threats")  as  "un-
protected,"  we  must  take  care  not to  obscure  the  continuing  rele-
vance  of the First Amendment's proscriptions  to government actions
that  target  instances within  those  "unprotected" categories  for sup-
s  367 U.S.  497, 543  (1961)  (Harlan, J., dissenting)  ("This  'liberty'  is not a series of isolated
points  pricked  out in terms of the  taking of property; the freedom  of speech, press, and  relig-
ion;  the  right to  keep  and  bear arms;  the  freedom  from  unreasonable  searches  and seizures;
and so on.  It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom  from all sub-
stantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ...  ").
9 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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pression along lines that discriminate in favor of some viewpoints and
against others.'"
Another  embodiment  of  geometrically-derived  unenumerated
rights-one perhaps camouflaged  by its familiarity-is  the practice of
enforcing  against  the  states those  individual rights  that are deemed
"implicit  in  the  concept  of ordered  liberty."'"  Common  legal  par-
lance  often  refers  to  this exercise  as  the  "incorporation" of parts of
the  Bill of Rights against the states, but that is surely a misnomer.  It
would be misleading, for instance, to think of this process as one that
merely transcribes  a series of discrete  points from one domain  (that
of rights against  the  federal government)  to another  (that  of rights
against  the  several  state  governments).  Rather,  the  process  is  one
that extrapolates  to state action  the lines or vectors that represent in-
ferred  limits  against  types  of  government  restriction,  where  those
lines  in  turn  connect  discrete  instances  of conduct  enumerated  as
impermissible  for  the  federal  government.  Although Justice  Black
famously urged that the  Bill of Rights in  its entirety be construed  as
applicable  to  state  action,"  the  Court's  actual  practice  was  one  of
gradual  linear  extrapolation,  not  an  act  of  one-time  boundary-
crossing  exportation.  As  Justice  Harlan  emphasized  in  Duncan v.
Lousiana, "[t]he  logically critical  thing  [in all instances of incorpora-
tion]  was not that the rights had been found. in the Bill of Rights, but
that  they were  deemed,  in the context of American  legal  history, to
be fundamental.'
3
10  Id. at 383-84  ("[Certain]  categories  of expression are 'not within the  area of constitution-
ally  protected  speech,'  ....  [T]hese  areas  of speech  can,  consistently  with  the  First  Amend-
ment,  be  regulated  because  of their constitutionally proscribable content  (obscenity,  defamation,
etc.)-not that they are categories of speech  entirely  invisible to the Constitution,  so  that they
may be made  the vehicles  for content  discrimination  unrelated  to  their  distinctively  proscrib-
able content.  Thus, the government  may proscribe  libel; but it may not make the further con-
tent discrimination  of proscribing  only libel  critical  of the  government. We  recently  acknowl-
edged this distinction ...  in upholding New York's child pornography law,  [where]  we expressly
recognized that there was no 'question  here of censoring a particular literary theme..  ").
Palko v.  Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
12  See,  e.g., Adamson v. California,  332 U.S. 46,  69, 71-72  (1947)  (Black, J.,  dissenting)  (ob-
jecting to the Court's assertion of the power to "expand and contract constitutional  standards to
conform  to  the Court's conception  of what at a  particular  time constitutes  'civilized  decency'
and  'fundamental liberty and justice,'" and asserting that  "one of the chief objects that the pro-
visions  of the  [Fourteenth]  Amendment's  first  section,  separately,  and  as  a  whole, were  in-
tended to accomplish was to make  the Bill of Rights, applicable  to the states").
13  391  U.S.  145,  179  (1968)  (Harlan,J., dissenting);  see also Adamson, 322  U.S.  at 62  (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)  ("Of all  [the judges to consider the Fourteenth Amendment since  its pas-
sage],  only one, who  may respectfully be called an eccentric  exception, ever indicated the belief
that the  Fourteenth Amendment  was  a shorthand  summary  of the  first  eight  Amendments
theretofore  limiting  only the  Federal  Government,  and  that due process  incorporated  those
eight Amendments  as restrictions  upon the powers of the States.").  If this proposition requires
further  support, one  need  only notice  that the set of rights protected under  the Due  Process
Clause  of the  Fourteenth Amendment  is  not coterminous  with  the  protections  of the Bill  of
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Of course,  the  Court's  extrapolations  have  not always  withstood
the  test of history, a point amply demonstrated by a now extinct, but
far from forgotten, progenitor of incorporation:  freedom of contract
as  the  core of "liberty."  Nonetheless,  the  Court's  assertion  that  the
police  power  of the  state  failed  to  reach  a  zone  of individual  eco-
nomic ordering-first  forged in pre-Erie diversity cases  applying gen-
eral common law,
14 and later applied as a federal constitutional prin-
ciple in the  Lochner era 5-was similarly grounded  on the assessment
that such a limitation  "grow[s]  out of the  essential nature of all free
governments.16
More  recently,  the  Court  held  in  Lawrence v.  Texas that a  state's
ban  on  oral-genital  and  anal-genital  contact  between  individuals  of
the  same sex denied "the most intimate and personal choices  a per-
son may  make in a lifetime,  choices  central  to  personal dignity  and
autonomy,  [which]  are  central to the  liberty protected  by the  Four-
teenth Amendment.
17  As I have elaborated elsewhere:
Lawrence's focus on the  role of self-regulating  relationships  in  American
liberty  suggests  that the  "Trivial Pursuit" version  of the due  process  "name
that liberty" game  arguably  validated  by  Glucksberg has finally  given way  to  a
focus  on  the underlying pattern  of self-government  (rather than  of state mi-
cromanagement)  defined by the rights enumerated  or implicit in the Consti-
tution or recognized by the landmark decisions construing it."
Lawrence did not repeat Lochners reliance on the arbitrary assumption
that  the  background  common  law  regimes  of  the  several  states-
regimes  that  undeniably  reinforced  substantial  inequalities  in
power-furnished  a  constitutionally  neutral  baseline  for unencum-
bered economic ordering.19  Nonetheless, while  Lawrence avoided that
Rights.  Compare Hardware  Dealers  Mut. Fire  Ins. Co. v.  Glidden Co.,  284 U.S.  151,  158  (1931)
(declining  to apply the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a civil jury trial to the states),  with In
reWinship,  397 U.S. 358, 364  (1970)  (holding that, independent of the Bill of Rights,  the Four-
teenth  Amendment  Due  Process  Clause  protects  defendants against  conviction  except  upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
1  See  1  LAURENCE  H.  TRIBE,  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAw  § 8-1,  at  1340-42  (3d  ed.
2000)  (demonstrating  that  the  willingness  of federal  courts  to  enforce  contractual  liberty
against the states prior to 1897 was limited to diversity cases).
15  See, e.g., Lochner  v. New York, 198  U.S.  45,  53 (1905)  ("The general right to make  a con-
tract  in relation  to his business  is  part of the liberty  of the individual  protected  by the  Four-
teenth Amendment  of the  Federal  Constitution."  (citing Allgeyer  v. Louisiana,  165  U.S.  578
(1897)));  Al/geyer, 165  U.S. at 591  ("To deprive  the citizen of such a right [to contract]  without
dueprocess of law is illegal.").
I  Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663  (1874).
17 539 U.S. 558, 574  (2003)  (quoting Planned  Parenthood  of Se.  Pa. v.  Casey, 505 U.S.  833,
851  (1992)).
Laurence  H.  Tribe,  Lawrence  v. Texas:  The  "Fundamental  Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117  HARv.  L.  REV.  1893,  1936  (2004)  (referencing  Washington  v.  Glucksberg,  521  U.S.
702  (1997)).
19 See, e.g., Adkins v.  Children's Hosp.,  261  U.S. 525,  545  (1923)  ("The  right of a person to
sell his labor upon such  terms as he deems proper is, in  its essence,  the same as the right of the
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particularly unsavory ingredient of the Lochner souffle,  the recipes re-
flected  by  the  two  decisions  had  more  in  common  than  many  of
Lochner's detractors  who  applaud  Lawrence are  inclined  to  concede.
Both  decisions  located  in the  ban  on  state  deprivations  of "liberty"
without  "due  process  of law"  a  substantive  limit on  laws  prohibiting
certain  consensual  relationships  between  adults  that the individuals
immediately involved, and those most directly affected,  deem to be in
their mutual  interest;  neither decision  could  point to any  textual or
historic  referent  more  determinate  than  the  open-ended  word  "lib-
erty" as its constitutional compass; and both decisions rested on quite
specific,  and  manifestly  controversial,  normative  theories  about  the
sorts  of limits  on freedom  that will, in the long run, advance human
liberty and dignity and the sorts that will instead prove oppressive.
But there  is at  least  this crucial  difference  between  the  two  deci-
sions:  Lawrence rested  on descriptive  premises both  sides in the dis-
pute would have been hard-pressed  to reject with respect to the most
profound  expressions  of the  self in relation  to others in our  civiliza-
tion and perhaps  in  all imaginable  human societies,  whereas  Lochner
presupposed  a sharply contested  set of assumptions  about the  osten-
sibly pre-political character of contractual and property arrangements
already widely believed,  as of the  time of the decision,  to  rest on de-
liberately  constructed  social  and  political  structures  and institutions
barely imaginable as essential features of the human  condition.
GEODESIC.  Think now of Buckminster Fuller's marvelous geodesic
domes-superstructures  capable  of enveloping  and  sheltering  indi-
viduals  and  their  relationships  and indeed  entire  organizations  and
living communities.  Even if it is the rigidity of the triangular form of
each face  of the polyhedron defining any such dome that gives these
shapes their stability and strength, the feature on which I rely in treat-
ing the domes  as  suitable metaphors for a  distinctive  mode  of rights
construction is the protective convex covering that the domes provide
to the plane on which they rest.  This image should bring to mind the
notion of "penumbral" or peripheral rights to which Justice Douglas's
opinion for the Court in  Griswold v.  Connecticue° referred-rights  rec-
ognized  (or, in truth, boldly posited)-to prevent the "specific rights"
purchaser  of labor to prescribe  the conditions upon which  he  will accept such labor from  the
person offering to sell....  In all such particulars  the employer and the employ6 have equality of
right, and any legislation  that disturbs  that equality  is an  arbitrary interference  with the liberty
of contract which no  government  can legally justify in  a  free  land."  (quoting Adair v.  United
States, 208 U.S. 161,  174-75  (1908))).
20  381  U.S.  479, 484-85  (1965)  ("[Certain]  cases suggest  that specific guarantees  in the Bill
of Rights have  penumbras,  formed  by emanations  from  those guarantees  that help give  them
life  and  substance."  (citing  Poe  v.  Ullman,  376  U.S.  497,  516-22  (1961)  (Harlan, J.,  dissent-
ing))).
Jan. 2007]JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
expressly identified and enumerated  in constitutional texts from  be-
coming "less secure."
"Rights" so conceived would appear to describe  claims of a less in-
trinsic or foundational  and more purely instrumental character  than
seems the  case  with respect  to  rights  geometrically extrapolated;  or-
dinarily,  at  least, the  rights lying  atop  any protective  scaffolding  or
shield  present  themselves  as  contingent  in  character,  provisional  as
well  as  prophylactic,  recognized  not as  intrinsically  valuable  in  the
way  that core,  or primary, rights  tend to be but as  essentially  instru-
mental and ancillary, and thus presumptively  subject  to legislative re-
placement  with  differently  designed  protective  structures,  provided
only  that  those  alternative  structures  be  equally  effective,  by  some
suitably  administered  measure,  in  securing  the underlying  rights  at
stake.  One  need  only recall  Chief Justice Warren's  construction  of
the  prophylactic  Miranda warnings  the  Court  required  the  govern-
ment to follow unless and until something as effective  (by the Court's
own lights)  in preventing coercive  custodial interrogation  were to be
legislatively  enacted,  in  order to  make  real  the  theoretical  right set
out  in  the  Fifth  Amendment's  privilege  against  compelled  self-
incrimination. 21
In  one  recent  case,  however-Dickerson v.  United State 22 -a  lop-
sided majority of the Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
treated  the  Miranda rules-despite  their  avowedly prophylactic  pur-
pose and  the express recognition that Congress remained free to re-
place  them with equally  effective  alternatives-as  "constitutional"  in
character.2  The  Court derived  that  characterization  not from a  re-
newed  examination  and  reaffirmation  of  the  legitimacy  of  the
Miranda Court's  imposition  of the  required warnings  upon  state  as
well  as federal law enforcement and adjudication  but from  a herme-
neutical exegesis of how the Court, both in  Miranda  itself and in suc-
ceeding cases,  had  described the  rules and applied  them in  a manner
that the Supreme  Court's purely supervisory  power  over the  federal
judicial system could not have justified.24
2  Miranda v.  Arizona, 384  U.S.  436,  490  (1966)  ("[T]he  Constitution does not require  any
specific code  of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination  during custo-
dial  interrogation.  Congress and  the States  are free  to  develop  their  own safeguards  for the
privilege,  so  long  as  they are  fully  as  effective  as  those  described  above  in informing  accused
persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise  it.").
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
23 See id. at 432  ("Miranda,  being a constitutional  decision of this Court, may not be in effect
overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule  Miranda  ourselves.").
24  See id. at 437-41  (noting that the Court's practice of applying Miranda  protections to state
court prosecutions  could be  legitimated  solely as  a means  of enforcing  the  Federal  Constitu-
tion).
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Having  concluded  that  Miranda's rules  had  therefore  been  pro-
nounced, rightly or wrongly,  in the  Constitution's  name  and  in the
Court's  constitutional  voice,  the Dickerson Court treated  as  automati-
cally  unconstitutional  a congressional  measure  purporting simply  to
repeal  Miranda  and  to  replace  its  rules,  not with  an  alternative  pro-
phylactic  regime,  but with a return  to case-by-case  assessment of each
confession's  voluntariness,  in effect viewing Congress's  effrontery  in
daring to disagree  with  the Court's  conclusion as  to the necessity  of
its  geodesic  constitutional  construct  as  sufficient  to  condemn  Con-
gress's action as unconstitutional even before addressing the continu-
ing validity  of the  Miranda precedent  as  a  matter  of constitutional
law.25  Turning to that issue, the Court quickly concluded that consid-
erations of stare decisis carried  the daY and accordingly declined to re-
visit Miranda's  constitutional validity.
In  dissent, Justice  Scalia  expressed  understandable  outrage  at
what he  deemed  worse  than  "a milestone  of judicial  overreaching,"
calling the Court's approach  the apex of 'Judicial arrogance." 27  More
relevant here, Justice Scalia  categorically denied  the legitimacy of any
purportedly  "constitutional"  rules  that are  purely  prophylactic  and
provisional  in  character.
2 8  He  therefore  dismissed  examples  drawn
from  judicially-derived  procedural  free  speech  protection  (such  as
the  rules  constraining  the  substantive  and  evidentiary  criteria  sur-
rounding defamation  suits, or the rules constraining  the allocation of
burdens  of proof in  matters  affecting  anti-government  speech)  and
similar areas  as readily distinguishable  on the ground  that the Court
had  in  those  instances found  the  particular  rules  in question  to  be
logically  necessary  parts  of the  underlying  constitutional  rights  and
not  merely  discretionary  rules  for  implementing  those  rights  in  a
comparatively  efficacious manner. 29
As Justice Scalia saw the matter, the role of crafting implementing
or instrumental  rules of that sort-rules  ancillary to specific constitu-
tional  rights but not conceptualized  as intrinsic  to those  rights-was
25 See  id.  at 444  ("In  sum, we  conclude  that Miranda announced  a constitutional  rule that
Congress may not supersede legislatively.").
26 See  id. at  443  ("Whether  or  not  we  agree  with  Miranda's reasoning  and  its  resulting
rule...  the principles  of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.").
27 Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 See  id.  at  454  ("[W]hat  makes  a  decision  'constitutional'  in  the  only  sense  relevant
here ...  is  the  determination  that  the  Constitution  requires the  result  that  the  decision  an-
nounces and  the  statute  ignores.  By  disregarding  congressional  action  that concededly  does
not violate  the Constitution, the Court flagrantly offends fundamental  principles of separation
of powers, and arrogates to itself prerogatives reserved to the representatives of the people.").
29 See,  e.g.,  id. at  459-60  ("In  these  cases,  and others  involving  the  First Amendment,  the
Court  has acknowledged  that in  order  to guarantee  that protected speech  is not  'chilled'  and
thus forgone, it is in some instances necessary  to incorporate in our substantive  rules 'a measure
of strategic protection.'").
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quintessentially legislative  rather than judicial in character.  He em-
phasized  that  Article  III  contains  no  analogue  to  the  enforcement
clauses  of the Fourteenth  and several  other Amendments  empower-
ing the judicial branch  to sculpt what I  have  here called geodesic  su-
perstructures to surround and effectuate the underlying rights.
3
'  And
he argued  that, to the  degree  the  enforcement  powers  entrusted  to
Congress  by these Amendments  are properly  understood  to include
authority  to  create  purely  prophylactic  prohibitions-something  he
questioned  in a later dissent 2 -those  powers,  in recognition of their
extraordinary  nature,  have  been judicially  cabined  by requirements
of congruence  and proportionality of a sort that neither  the Miranda
Court nor the Dickerson Court saw fit to impose on itself.
33
It seems  fair to  say  that Justice  Scalia,  in contrast to  the Justices
joining  the  Rehnquist  majority in  Dickerson, regarded  the  process  of
layering implementing rules like  those of Miranda  over the core con-
stitutional  requirements  that  those  rules  are  meant  to  enforce-
there, the  requirement  that criminally  incriminating statements  not
be  involuntarily extracted  for trial use against an accused-as  consti-
tutionally legitimate, if at all,  only as a properly  constrained  exercise
of sub-constitutional  lawmaking  power,  and never  as a  matter of in-
ference directly from the Constitution itself.
In  some tension with his objection  to the high-handed  and  hege-
monic nature  of the Court's claim to automatic supremacy over Con-
gress in matters  of constitutional  construction, Justice  Scalia  seemed
to be  taking the position that a genuinely  "constitutional"  rule must
invariably  have  a  necessary  rather  than  contingent,  a  permanent
rather  than  provisional,  character,  and  can  never be  adopted judi-
cially  as  merely  the  best  available  means  of avoiding  core  constitu-
tional  violations  unless  and  until  legislatively  supplanted  by  some-
thing equally efficacious.
Consider what this construct would imply for the right of an inter-
ested  listener  or viewer  to  receive,  without  government  inhibition
based on content,  the  views  and information  that a  willing  (even  if
30  "[W]hat  today's decision will stand for, whether the Justices can bring themselves to say it
or not, is the power of the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional  Constitu-
tion, binding on Congress and the States."  Id. at 461.
31  Id. at 460-61  ("Where the Constitution  has wished to lodge in one of the branches  of the
Federal Government  some  limited power to supplement  its guarantees,  it has said so.")  (citing
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
82 Tennessee  v. Lane,  541  U.S. 509,  558-59  (2004)  (Scalia, J., dissenting)  (deeming prophy-
lactic legislation  "reinforcement rather than enforcement" and  thus violative  of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
33 Dickerson, 530  U.S.  at 460-61  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting)  ("The power  with which  the  Court
would endow itself under a 'prophylactic'  justification  for Miranda  goes far beyond  what it has
permitted Congress to do under authority of that text." (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 520 (1997))).
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constitutionally  unprotected  by virtue  of extraterritoriality)  speaker
chooses  to transmit.  This "right to receive information" is a right that
Justice  Brennan,  concurring  in  Lamont v.  Postmaster General,  point-
edly described  in terms  suggesting  that he  was  at the time  laying the
groundwork for recognizing  a "right to  privacy"  as among  the "pen-
umbral" unenumerated  rights in the then-pending  case of Griswold v.
Connecticut.  Such  a "right" would  seemingly count  as  sufficiently  es-
sential  to any coherent version  of the "freedom of speech"  to escape
condemnation  under  the  strict  test  enunciated  in Justice  Scalia's
Dickerson dissent.  If that  is  so,  then what Justice  Brennan,  at least,
seemed  prepared  to describe  as an "unenumerated" right-the right
to  receive information from a willing speaker-would appear to survive
the  Scalia  test.  But  it would  survive  that  test  only  because,  in  the
Scalia  scheme  of things,  that right  was  not truly  an  instance  of an
"unenumerated"  right at all  but  was  instead merely  a logical  entail-
ment of a solidly enumerated right to free speech.
In Justice  Scalia's tightly  constricted universe,  "geodesically" con-
structed  rights, if they are  rights at all,  must therefore  collapse into
logical  derivations  from  rights  that  are  firmly enumerated-and  in
that  sense  must  amount  to  relatively  trivial  instances  of "geometri-
cally" derived straight-line  extrapolations  located  on  the same  plane
as the rights from which  they stem.  Otherwise, such constructs would
represent nothing more than improperly legislated pretenders  to the
status  of "unenumerated"  constitutional  rights,  lacking  all  legal  le-
gitimacy.
For  all  its  rhetorical  force,  one  must  remember  that  Justice
Scalia's  was,  of course, but a proposed  counter-universe.  The  legal
world  as understood  by the Dickerson majority left  room for geodesi-
cally constructed constitutional rights that could not be geometrically
extrapolated  as necessary entailments of rights properly described  as
textually "enumerated."  That such rights remain subject in theory to
alternative  enforcement  regimes-although  not, plainly, to  a  naked
congressional  decision  to  ditch  them  without  substituting  anything
beyond what the  Court had already  found wanting-means that they
are  not directly derivable  from  rights of unquestioned  textual  pedi-
gree.  But if the relationship of these "unenumerated" rights to rights
of such  pedigree  is a relationship of means  to ends, at least it seems
plain  that  the  contours  of  that  relationship  were  not  viewed  in
Dickerson as  too  indeterminate  to  permit judicial  determination  of
when  the rights  have been  sufficiently if alternatively  protected or of
who bore an obligation  to protect them.
34  381  U.S.  301,  307  (1965)  (finding the  requirement  that an  addressee  request in writing
the delivery of certain literature to be an  unacceptable burden  on First Amendment  fights).
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Of quite a different character would  be such material guarantees
as those purportedly  ensuring minimally adequate  shelter, nutrition,
health care,  or occupational  or educational  opportunity.  Enforcing
such  guarantees would  no doubt facilitate,  and would  certainly  ren-
der  more  meaningful,  such  enumerated  rights as  the  right  to speak
one's  mind  or  the  right  to  practice  one's  religion,  and  such  more
readily  extrapolated  rights  as  the  right to  cast an  equal  vote.  Thus
these  material  guarantees would  seem  to  fall  within  the  theoretical
reach  of the geodesic  method and hence to constitute  potential can-
didates  for  recognition  as  unenumerated  constitutional  rights.  Yet
the irreducible  indeterminacy of the inquiry into whose responsibility
it  is  to fulfill  these  rights,  and of the  inquiry into when  these  rights
are to be  deemed fulfilled,  makes quite implausible-in  anything re-
sembling  today's American  constitutional  culture M-the  proposition
that such rights are constitutionally enshrined.
Considerably  less  attenuated  in today's  constitutional  universe  is
the set of what might aptly be regarded as the "unenumerated" rights
of  state  and  local  governments.  Think,  for  instance,  of Justice
O'Connor's and Justice  Kennedy's  frequent exhortations  about how
our federalism  "split the  atom of sovereignty, '36 in the  latter's  felici-
tous phrase,  not as  an end in itself but as a  means of giving  double
security to individual citizens'  rights against overbearing government.
Given  Chief Justice Rehnquist's  evocative  reference  to  the "tacit pos-
tulates"  of the  "constitutional  plan
37  in  describing  the  precepts  of
federalism-and  given  the  general  recognition  that  nothing  in  the
Constitution's  text points  to,  much  less  "enumerates,"  many  of the
"states'  rights" recognized  by  the  Rehnquist  Court and bound  to be
preserved  or extended  in  the jurisprudence  of the  Roberts  Court-
should one not view the "rights" of the quasi-sovereign states-for in-
stance, their rights not to be "commandeered" in the exercise of their
38  39  40 lawmaking,  executive,  or adjudicatory  functions  -as  amenable  to
geodesic, even if not geometric, construction?
Cf S. AFR.  CONST.  1996, ch. II, §§  24-29, reprinted in 16  CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF  THE  WORLD  15-18 (2004)  (providing for economic and social rights including the right to a
secure  environment,  adequate  housing,  health  care,  food,  water,  social  security,  and  educa-
tion);  Mattias Kumm,  Constitutional  Rights as Principles:  On  the Structure and Domain of Constitu-
tional  Justice, 2  INT'LJ.  CONST. L.  574, 586  (2004)  (book review)  (noting that the German  Fed-
eral  Constitutional  Court  has  interpreted  German  Basic  Law  to provide  social  rights  such  as
minimum subsistence as furthering  "the necessary preconditions for the meaningful realization
of liberties"  (citing ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS  334-48  (Julian  Rivers
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002)  (1986))).
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,  838 (1995)  (KennedyJ,  concurring).
37 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433  (1979)  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38  New York  v.  United  States,  505  U.S.  144,  161  (1992)  ("Congress  may  not simply  'com-
mandee[r]  the legislative  processes of the States  by directly compelling them  to enact and en-
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The opinions of the four Justices who  have dissented from nearly
all of the decisions establishing such rights-insisting that such rights
need no judicial  protection  because  the  political  process  suffices  to
guarantee  their  survival, 4'  need  protection  of a  much  thinner  and
more  deferential  variety in  light  of the  empirical  uncertainties  sur-
rounding  how best to  realize  federalism's  aspirations,42  or no  longer
43 make sense at all as "rights" in light of contemporary realities 4-seem
to me  thinly veiled denials that geodesically derived rights of this sort,
once one concedes  their contingent rather than inevitable character,
ever deserve to be included  in the "unenumerated rights" pantheon.
force  a federal  regulatory  program.'"  (quoting  Hodel  v.  Va.  Surface  Mining  &  Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288  (1981))).
39  Printz  v.  United  States,  521  U.S.  898,  935  (1997)  ("Congress  cannot  circumvent  th[e]
prohibition  [against compelling  a state  to  enact or enforce  a federal  regulatory program]  by
conscripting the States' officers directly.").
40 Alden v. Maine,  527  U.S. 706,  744  (1999)  ("[The Court]  ha[s]  discovered  no instance  in
which  [an early Congress]  purported  to authorize  suits  against nonconsenting  States  in  [state
courts].").
41  See, e.g., United  States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647  (2000)  (Souter,J.,joined by  Stevens,
Ginsburg,  & Breyer, J.J.,  dissenting)  (arguing that the  Founders had concluded  in  their "con-
sideredjudgment  that politics, not judicial  review,  should mediate  between  state and  national
interests  as  the  strength and  legislative jurisdiction  of the National  Government  inevitably in-
creased  through the expected growth of the national economy");  id. at 661  (Breyer, J., joined in
this part by Stevens, J., dissenting)  (noting that "Congress, when it enacted  the statute, followed
procedures  that help  to protect the federalism values at  stake.  It provided adequate  notice to
the States of its intent to legislate  in an  'are [a]  of traditional  state regulation.'"  (citing id. at 615
(majority opinion))); Printz, 521  U.S.  at 957  (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg,  & Breyer,
J.J.,  dissenting)  ("The majority points  to nothing suggesting that the political safeguards of fed-
eralism identified in Garcia need be supplemented by a rule, grounded in neither constitutional
history nor text, flatly prohibiting the National  Government from  enlisting state and local offi-
cials  in the implementation  of federal  law.");  United States v.  Lopez, 514  U.S. 549,  604  (1995)
(Souter, J.,  dissenting)  (arguing that the Court's deference to congressional  invocations  of the
Commerce  Clause reflects its "appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's politi-
cal accountability  in dealing with matters open  to a wide range  of possible choices").
42 See,  e.g, Printz, 521  U.S.  at 976-77 (Breyer, J.,joined  by  Stevens, J.,  dissenting)  (observing
that "[a]t  least some other countries, facing the same basic problem,  have found that local con-
trol  is better maintained  through  application  of a principle  that  is  the direct  opposite of the
principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution.  The federal systems of Swit-
zerland,  Germany, and  the European  Union, for  example,  all provide  that constituent states,
not federal  bureaucracies,  will  themselves  implement  many of the laws,  rules,  regulations,  or
decrees enacted  by the central  'federal'  body....  They do so  in part  because  they believe  that
such a system  interferes less,  nor more, with  the independent authority of the 'state,'  member
nation, or other subsidiary government, and helps  to safeguard individual  liberty as well.").
43 See generally Lawrence  Lessig,  Understanding  Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory,  47 STAN.
L. REv.  395  (1995)  (developing the  thesis that fidelity  to original  constitutional  meaning, pur-
posively  understood,  often requires  translating  the  way an original  text had  been read  so that
the translated "reading" is more faithful  to the original meaning of the provision or principle in
question,  given  altered  circumstances  and  contexts,  than  the  original  "reading"  would  have
been).
44 See, e.g.,  Alden, 527 U.S. at 763  (Souter, J., dissenting)  (objecting to the Court's holding as
"a conception necessarily implied  by statehood itself...  [that]  is...  not one of common law so
much  as of natural law, a universally applicable proposition  discoverable  by reason").
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As such, those dissents leave much to be desired--even when the ma-
jority opinions  against which  they  are  cast  are  conspicuously  unre-
sponsive  to  the dissenters'  claims,  and even when  one  might in the
end find some of the majority's holdings unconvincing.
4 5
Although I have discussed constitutionally unenumerated rights of
state  governments  in terms of the geodesic  model, it would be a mis-
take to regard that model as necessarily  the most powerful  in under-
standing the  structure  and  derivation  of those  rights.  On  the  con-
trary, such  rights  might well  be understood  best either  in  terms  of
what I  would  call  the  geological  model or  in  terms of what  I would
describe as the monster-barring  or slope-avoiding  model.
GEOLOGICAL:  The  third form of rights construction-although  in
this instance perhaps  a better term would be deconstruction-entails
neither  geometrically  linking  enumerated  rights  nor  extrapolating
from  such  rights,  on  the  one  hand,  nor  geodesically  constructing
shields for their protection, on the other.  Instead, it involves digging
beneath  a recognized  enumerated  right or set of rights  so as  to un-
earth  the logical  or sociological  presuppositions  of those  rights,  the
postulates  they should  be  understood  to  reflect,  or  the  underlying
(typically  more  substantive)  rights  without which  the  rights enumer-
ated  (often  more  procedural or  quasi-procedural  in cast)  would  be
rendered  incoherent  or  largely purposeless.  Recall Justice  Harlan's
suggestion, in his Poe v.  Uliman dissent, that the Fourth Amendment's
various  search-and-seizure-related  protections  for  "the  right  of the
people  to  be  secure  in  their...  houses, 6  would  make  little  or  no
sense but for an underlying  "solicitude to protect the privacies of the
life within.,
4 7
In  much  that  spirit,  in  my  oral  argument  representing  Michael
Hardwick, who  had been  arrested for engaging  in  consensual  sex at
home  with  another  man  in  Bowers v. Hardwick, I suggested  that the
Third Amendment's  protection  against  "quarter[ing]  [regiments  of
soldiers]  in  any house, without the  consent of the  Owner,"8  would
make  little sense  if there  were  no substantive  limit whatever  on the
45  See Laurence  H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does The Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend
the Future---or  Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113  HARv.  L. REV.  110,  139-41  (1999)  (noting
that although Justice  Stevens criticized the  majority in Printz v.  United States for selectively  em-
ploying  "unconstrained  modes  of structural  inference,"  it  is  likely  that  "in  the  current  era,
claims of individual  rights are most likely to have power and ultimately to prevail if they can be
convincingly  expressed  through  the  language,  and  clearly  understood  through  the  logic,  of
such  concretely architectural  features of the Constitution  as the separation  of powers  or, more
to the point here, the federal system of separate, equal, and semi-autonomous  states").
46  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551  (1961)  (Harlan,J., dissenting).
48  U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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authority enjoyed by the state  to regiment every last detail of what the
owner did behind closed doors in the privacy of that home.49
Rights that bear substantively on the allocation of decision-making
authority with respect to particular realms or domains of life-if their
assumed,  but  not  textually  articulated,  existence  is  arguably  neces-
sary, in a given  time and place,  to render purposeful  one or more of
the rights that are articulated in  the  constitutional  text-would  seem
to be prime candidates for the unenumerated rights "retained by the
people" to which  the Ninth Amendment  refers.  We  might disagree
that one or another specific allocation of decision-making roles-with
respect to reproductive  choice,  to take  a prominent instance,  or with
respect to end-of-life  decisions, to posit another-is indeed necessary
to  render  various  enumerated  rights  meaningful,  to  prevent  them
from being  mere  hollow shells, but there  should be wide  agreement
that the inquiry into  such  necessity  represents  the  crucial step  in  a
distinctly  "geological"  approach  to  identifying  something  as  an un-
enumerated but constitutionally protected right.
Failure to  make  a convincing  case for a  given  right's necessity  in
these  terms means, by definition, that the geological method fails  to
generate  the right in question.  It does not necessarily mean that the
contested  right cannot  be  otherwise  generated.  In  particular,  the
fourth form  of rights derivation-the  method that focuses  on "mon-
ster-barring" or slippery-slope avoidance-might yet furnish a persua-
sive basis for admitting a claimed right into the unenumerated  rights
universe.  We turn, then, to:
MONSTER-BARRING:  This  form  of rights  construction  employs  a
method for which  I have borrowed  a label from the mathematical lo-
gician,  Imre  Lakatos,  whose  1976  book,  Proofs and Refutations:  The
Logic of Mathematical  Discovery, uses that label to describe  (and to criti-
cize)  the mode  of reasoning  in which  one approaches  mathematical
proof by pretending that counterexamples  to supposed truths are not
genuine  counterexamples  but  "monsters"  that  can  simply  be  ig-
nored.5 0  As I use the term here, "monster-barring" entails rejecting as
unconstitutional  any government  action  whose  constitutional  legiti-
macy we could  accept only at the  monstrous price  of treating some
established constitutional boundary or limitation as entirely empty or
wholly ineffectual.
49  Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Bowers v. Hardwick,  478 U.S. 186 (1986)  (No. 85-140),
reprinted in  164  LANDMARK  BRIEFS  AND  ARGUMENTS  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE  UNITED
STATES:  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAw  1985 TERM  SUPPLEMENT 653 (Philip B. Kurland  & Gerhard Cas-
per eds.,  1987).
50 For further discussion of Lakatos's monster-barring  approach and its relationship  to law,
see  LAURENCE H.  TRIBE &  MICHAEL C. DORF, ON  READING THE CONSTITUTION  88-92  (1991).
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Witness  Chief Justice  Rehnquist's  assertion  in  United States v.  Lo-
pez 5  that giving one's constitutional  blessing to the congressional  ban
on  possession  of firearms  near  schools  would  in  principle  commit
one to accept the constitutional  legitimacy, at least insofar as affirma-
tive  authority is concerned, of literally any assertion of congressional
power  over any  aspect of life.52  The  Chief Justice's majority  opinion
in that case  challenges  the dissenters  to propose a limiting principle
that might provide  some purchase  along an otherwise limitlessly slip-
pery slope.  The majority treats the dissenters'  failure to propose such
a principle  as  proof that only a right  to  avoid congressional  regula-
tion of the type  there involved could serve to forestall  the monstrous
outcome of essentially  erasing the Tenth Amendment and  repudiat-
ing the generally accepted axiom the Amendment  expresses-to wit,
that ours is a government of limited national powers.
Just so, it may well be that the strongest argument for treating cer-
tain intimate  realms of personal choice as implicating unenumerated
constitutional  rights  is  the  monster-barring  argument  that,  if  one
were  to  cede to  government  the  authority  to intrude willy-nilly, and
without  any particularly  compelling justification,  into  the  realms  in
question,  one would in essence have ceded to  government powers so
boundless as  to efface  the  very idea of personal  rights, leaving virtu-
ally nothing beyond the reach of government.
Nor  need  unenumerated  rights  so  constructed  be  expressed  as
substantive spheres  of conduct or forms of relationship that the logic
of monster-barring  puts  presumptively  beyond the  reach  of govern-
mental power to forbid, to mandate, or to shape.  Similar in structure
would be an argument that permitting government to regulate some
particular aspect of life  along a specific  axis, in a particular manner,
in terms of a given variable,  or in service of a particular value or end,
would be tantamount to erasing a vital constraint on permissible gov-
ernment action that we have agreed the Constitution enumerates.  In
Larkin v.  Grendel's Den, Inc., 5  for example,  I represented  a restaurant
in challenging a Massachusetts  law that empowered churches to wield
over  businesses operating  in  their immediate  vicinity a form  of gov-
ernmental  authority-there,  a veto  over  a commercial  activity  (serv-
ing liquor  to  customers)-that  had been  preferentially  delegated  to
such churches  (and to selected  others but not to all institutions simi-
larly situated).  The  Court was persuaded  that sustaining the constitu-
tional  legitimacy  of that preferential  delegation  of secular  power  to
51  514 U.S. 549  (1995).
52 Id. at 564 ("Under the theories  that the Government presents in  support of § 922(q),  it is
difficult  to perceive  any  limitation  on  federal  power, even  in  areas  such  as  criminal  law  en-
forcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.").
5 459 U.S.  116 (1982).
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religious  institutions would for all practical  purposes have eliminated
the anti-establishment  principle  in its entirety from the array of con-
stitutional constraints  on government.
5 4
The unenumerated  rights that emerge  from  geometric, geodesic,
geological,  and monster-barring constructions  may take many forms.
They  may be  procedural  or substantive,  individual  or  structural,  in-
tensely controversial or widely accepted.  Some of these rights may be
cognizable  not merely  as  the product  of a  single  one  of these  tech-
niques, but as the overlapping or converging  result of multiple meth-
ods  of  rights  construction.  For  example,  the  anti-commandeering
holdings  of New  York  v.  United States
5 5 and  Printz v.  United StateS6 -
whose  grounding  in  the  history  of  the  founding  the  dissenters  in
those cases fairly demolished-might rest more comfortably either on
the  geodesic  notion  that  politically  transparent  separation  between
dual  sovereigns  guards  other liberties protected in  the  Constitution,
or  on  the  monster-barring argument  that upholding  the  federal  di-
rectives at issue  in those cases would  have reduced  state and local ju-
risdictions  to  little more  than field  offices of an  all-powerful central
government, a consequence  difficult to square with the Constitution's
"tacit postulates" regarding at least a modicum of state sovereignty.
My intention in this exploratory  essay has not been to defend any
particular  mode  of rights  construction  over  any other,  to  extol  the
virtues  of the  entire  enterprise  over  its well-known  difficulties,  or to
champion  the inclusion of one or another personal or governmental
right in-or the exclusion  of any particular right from-the  "unenu-
merated" rights  canon.  Although  my previous  writings  have  frankly
embraced  organic  and evolutionary  over mechanistic  and static  con-
ceptions of constitutional interpretation,  this Essay is not intended as
an  attempt to claim  constitutional status for any particular subset  of
the historic landmarks punctuating our political and moral develop-
ment as  a  nation  that find  no  explicit  reflection  in  the  text of the
written Constitution.
Only  a  false  equation  between  the  Constitution's  evolving  con-
tents  and  the  ever-changing  measure  of  how  government  ideally
ought to behave and what it ought ideally  to avoid doing could foster
the  fallacy  that  "unenumerated  rights"  or  the  "unwritten  constitu-
tion" define whatever  it might take to fill the sometimes yawning gap
between  what the constitutional  text tells  us and what counts  as fun-
damental about our political and legal  morality at each phase  in our
national  evolution.  In  attempting  to  develop  a  taxonomy  for  the
Id. at  126  ("This  statute  enmeshes  churches  in the  exercise of substantial  governmental
powers contrary to our consistent interpretation  of the Establishment Clause  ...
55 505 U.S. 144  (1992).
56  521  U.S. 898 (1997).
Jan. 2007]JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
available  methods of deriving and structuring the rights that the Con-
stitution supports but does not enumerate, I have not sought to close
that  gap  or to erase  the fundamental  distinction  between  what our
polity accepts as just or condemns as indecent and what its Constitu-
tion mandates, permits or forbids.
On the contrary, it is precisely our Constitution's memorialization
of such  practices as  slavery, and our tradition  of never erasing  what-
ever  the  Constitution  might  at  one  time  have  inscribed-however
shameful  its  doing  so  may  have  been-that  constitutes  one  of  the
greatest  virtues  of its written  character  and of its  adherence  to  the
poet's  dictum  that  "The  Moving  Finger  writes;  and,  having  writ,
Moves  on.""  That  so  much  of our  Constitution  as  is  expressed  in
writing  continues  permanently  to  register  even  outdated  and  since
repudiated  traces of its compromises with expediency and with evil is
an  antidote  against  the  temptations  of  collective  forgetting.  The
Constitution's writtenness  ensures  that  the  darkest  episodes  of our
past-insofar  as  they  have  found  expression  in  the  Constitution's
text-cannot be  airbrushed  from our history.  And it ensures as well
that we  never lose sight of the distinction between what the Constitu-
tion, written  or unwritten,  permits  or demands  and  what  common
decency  and wise statecraft  might require.  That  is  the meaning,  in
constitutional  discourse, of the poet's reminder:  "nor all your Piety
nor Wit  Shall lure  it back  to  cancel  half a  Line, Nor  all your  Tears
wash out a Word of it."58
Pathbreaking  acts of Congress and other potentially more  transi-
tory expressions  of our national  struggle,  however  much  they  some-
times  contribute  to  the  growing  recognition  of one  or another  un-
enumerated  right  as  grounded  in  the  Constitution,  however  much
they may count as vital stepping stones along the legal path of the na-
tion's development, and however  entrenched  they might in practice
become  in our history  and tradition,  all  remain  subject, should they
ever be repealed,  to total erasure  from the  enacted  annals of our le-
gal past.  Such federal statutes and other collective  expressions of our
national will thus remain worth distinguishing from  the Constitution
proper, both in  its  glacially  changing  written  projections  and  in  its
more fluid and volatile unwritten premises.  My aim in this brief Essay
has been to dissect the ways in which those more fluid but still consti-
tutionally  grounded  unwritten  premises  may  be  connected  to,  and
may be understood  as arising from, the written text itself.
57 THE RUBAtYAT  OF  OMAR  KHAYAM  verse  71,  at 106  (Christopher Decker ed.,  Edward Fitz-
Gerald  trans., Univ. Press of Va. 1997)  (1879).
58  Id.
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